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Abstract7
We employ laboratory methods to study the stability of competitive equilibrium in Scarf’s8
economy (International Economic Review, 1960). Tatonnement theory predicts that9
prices are globally unstable for this economy, i.e. unless prices start at the competitive10
equilibrium they oscillate without converging. Anderson et al. (Journal of Economic11
Theory, 2004) report that in laboratory double auction markets, prices in the Scarf econ-12
omy do indeed oscillate with no clear sign of convergence. We replicate their experiments13
and confirm that tatonnement theory predicts the direction of price changes remarkably14
well. Prices are globally unstable with adverse effects for the economy’s efficiency and15
the equitable distribution of the gains from trade.16
We also introduce a novel market mechanism where participants submit demand17
schedules and prices are computed using Smale’s global Newtonian dynamic (American18
Economic Review, 1976). If the submitted schedules are competitive - sets of quantities19
that maximize utility taking prices as given - the resulting outcome is the unique com-20
petitive equilibrium of Scarf’s economy. In experiments using the schedule market, prices21
converge quickly to the competitive equilibrium. Besides stabilizing prices, the schedule22
market is more efficient and results in highly egalitarian outcomes.23
JEL classification: C92; D50
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1. Introduction24
This paper investigates how the design of the market influences price dynamics and25
trading volumes in Scarf’s (1960) economy. In Scarf’s economy, the tatonnement model26
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predicts that prices cycle along a closed orbit around the equilibrium without ever con-1
verging. In a series of fascinating experiments, Anderson et al. (2004) implemented2
a version of Scarf’s economy in the laboratory to study how prices evolve in the com-3
monly used double auction market. While the double auction is itself a distinctively4
non-tatonnement institution, Anderson et al. found strong support for the Walrasian5
tatonnement hypothesis that price dynamics are largely driven by a market’s excess de-6
mand.1 Average trade prices in the experiments cycled along a closed orbit around the7
unique competitive equilibrium with no clear sign of convergence.28
A consequence of out of equilibrium price cycling is that an efficient allocation of9
resources may never be realized. This motivates our market design question: is there a10
market mechanism that stabilizes prices in Scarf’s economy and leads to higher welfare?11
The main idea behind our proposed solution is to exploit the price-taking behavior that12
causes instability in the double auction market, as observed by Anderson et al. (2004).13
Such price-taking behavior has also been observed in other experimental studies, e.g.14
Friedman and Ostroy (1995).3 The proposed mechanism is a call market where agents15
submit demand schedules, which are aggregated to yield an excess demand function.416
A Newtonian process suggested by Smale (1976b) is then used to find market clearing17
prices. Whether this schedule market produces desirable outcomes obviously depends18
on the types of schedules that get submitted. But if every agent submits a competitive19
schedule, i.e. a set of quantities that are utility maximizing taking prices as given, then20
the mechanism produces prices and quantities corresponding to the unique competitive21
equilibrium of the Scarf economy.22
We ran two series of experiments. The first series was devoted to replicating Anderson23
et al.’s (2004) experiments. One of the major strengths of laboratory experimentation24
for investigating general equilibrium is control, as the Anderson et al. study exemplifies.25
By inducing carefully selected demand parameters and initial endowments, the exper-26
imenters were able to create a version of Scarf’s economy in the laboratory to study27
its equilibration properties. Another major strength of experimentation is replicability28
and the importance of Anderson et al’s findings motivated our study. Furthermore, we29
extend the theoretical analysis of Anderson et al. by developing a model of out of equi-30
librium trading in the double auction, which allows us to model not just prices but also31
1We use tatonnement model and Walrasian hypothesis interchangeably to refer to a model that
predicts prices adjust in proportion to excess demand. We use tatonnement institution to refer to a
market institution where prices are centrally adjusted according to excess demand and trade only occurs
at equilibrium prices. There have been several other experimental tests of the Walrasian hypothesis.
Smith (1962) finds some support for it although the “excess rent” hypothesis he introduces does better.
Crockett et al. (2011) find support for the Walrasian hypothesis in an experimental study of Gale’s
(1963) economy.
2While the Scarf economy is an idealized example whose conditions are unlikely to be met in practice,
this type of disequilibrium behavior is akin to price cycles observed in some important commodity
markets, see for example Cashin and McDermott (2002).
3A large market is not a necessary condition for price-taking behavior to be optimal, see e.g. Ostroy
(1980).
4Submitting demand schedules is a common feature of electricity markets, IPOs, and treasury auc-
tions. Furthermore, this procedure is used prior to the start of the New York Stock Exchange to provide
the opening prices for the day. Schedule markets are understudied compared to the double auction
market, but an early laboratory test is reported by Smith et al. (1982) who consider a single-commodity
market for which stability is not an issue. They find that a schedule market produces efficiency levels
similar to those observed in the double auction market.
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quantities traded and hence welfare. It is based on Hahn and Negishi’s (1962) model of1
price adjustment with centralized price setting but trading at non-equilibrium prices. A2
set of prices is called and then trade occurs such that if there is excess demand for a3
certain good before trading, after trading no one is left holding more of that good than4
they demand (and vice-versa if there is excess supply). After trading, prices are adjusted5
according to excess demand.5 We show that the model predicts behavior in the double6
auction market experiments remarkably well.7
The second series of experiments tested our newly designed schedule market in the8
same controlled environment. This “engineering” approach, which combines institutional9
design with laboratory “wind tunnel” testing, has, to the best of our knowledge, not10
previously been applied to enhance the stability of several interconnected markets. In-11
terestingly, price taking behavior, submitting a competitive schedule, is actually a weakly12
dominant strategy in the Scarf economy. Furthermore, when others submit competitive13
schedules, the supply curve that each agent faces is “flat.” This non-generic feature14
follows from the specific parametrization of the Scarf economy.615
It is natural to wonder if experimental testing is even necessary, given that submitting16
a competitive schedule is a weakly dominant strategy. First, the experiments let us test17
whether the mechanism works when schedules are generated by eliciting quantities with18
a relatively coarse price grid and are then interpolated to create a continuous function.19
More importantly, however, there are a number of reasons to be cautious about assuming20
people will necessarily play weakly dominant strategies. It is not clear that subjects in21
the experiments will be able to identify the weakly dominant strategy by reasoning,22
much like they are not able to find the competitive equilibrium by reasoning in the23
double auction market. Furthermore, previous studies have found that people do not24
always play weakly dominant strategies. In individual decision making tasks where the25
weakly dominant strategy may appear obvious, subjects often do not behave optimally26
(Cason and Plott, 2014). In second-price auctions, subjects typically overbid relative to27
their values. In call markets, subjects are often insensitive to whether sincere bidding28
is a weakly dominant strategy and tend to initially bid further from their true value29
than optimal (Cason and Friedman, 1997). Instead of assuming that weakly dominant30
strategies are necessarily played, we consider the assumption that subjects use a myopic31
strategy of submitting a schedule that is a best response to the previously observed price32
but more elastic or more inelastic than the competitive schedule. We prove that under33
5There are some other notable models with trading at non-equilibrium prices. Keisler (1995; 1996)
introduces a model with decentralized price setting. There is a single market maker who holds an
inventory and sets prices. Agents are randomly selected to trade with the market maker. The market
maker adjusts prices in such a way that his inventory remains approximately constant over time. Crockett
et al. (2008) augment the zero-intelligence trading model with a learning rule that directs convergence
to competitive equilibrium. They consider an infinite-horizon model where, in each period, out-of-
equilibrium trade yields an allocation in the contract set. The utility gradient at that allocation is then
interpreted as a price vector that is used to redistribute wealth to generate a new starting allocation for
the next period. The model is a globally stable alternative to Walras’ tatonnement. See also Crockett
(2008) for an experimental test of the model.
6Indeed, there is a large literature on supply function equilibria that studies oligopolistic markets
where firms choose supply schedules and do not necessarily face a flat residual demand curve, see for
instance, Klemperer and Meyer (1989). Importantly, however, in large economies, the supply curve faced
by each agent is approximately flat for arbitrary specifications of preferences and endowments. As a
result, submitting competitive schedules is optimal more generally when the economy grows large.
3
stationary repetition, prices gradually converge to the competitive equilibrium.1
1.1. Organization2
The next section briefly reviews the tatonnement adjustment process and shows that3
it is unstable in Scarf’s (1960) economy. Section 3 describes the issues in designing a4
stable market mechanism and puts forth a specific proposal. Section 4 describes the5
design of an experiment that compares this novel mechanism to the standard double6
auction market. The results are reported in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. Appendices7
A and B contain additional theoretical results and proofs. Appendix C provides a detailed8
comparison with the Anderson et al. (2004) study, which employed only the continuous9
double auction market.10
2. Background11
2.1. Walrasian dynamics in Scarf ’s economy12
Scarf (1960) proposes a simple economy with three goods, call them apples (A),13
bananas (B), and coconuts (C), and three types of agents whose preferences and endow-14
ments can be summarized as follows:15
type A type B type C
utility min(qA, qB) min(qB , qC) min(qC , qA)
endowment 1 Apple 1 Banana 1 Coconut
Consider a typeA agent who is endowed with one apple and has utility function min(qA, qB).16
For given prices pA and pB this agent’s demands for apples and bananas are qA = qB =17
pA
pA+pB
. Notice that there are income effects, i.e. agent A’s demands for both apples and18
bananas rise (fall) when the price of apples (bananas) goes up. The demands for type19
B and C agents can be derived similarly, and it is readily verified that the equilibrium20
prices for which demand equals supply satisfy pA = pB = pC . Without loss of generality21
we can single out coconuts to be the numeraire good and fix its price to pC = 1. Then22
the competitive equilibrium price of each of the goods is one.23
How does the economy arrive at competitive equilibrium prices? Consider any set of24
prices pA and pB for apples and bananas respectively expressed in terms of the numeraire25
pC = 1. In Walras’ tatonnement process, the change of price of each good is equal to its26
excess demand. In vector notation, dp(t)/dt = z(p), or written out in components27
dpA
dt
= n
( 1
1 + pA
− pB
pA + pB
)
dpB
dt
= n
( pA
pA + pB
− 1
1 + pB
)
where n ≥ 1 is the number of replicas of each type of agent in the economy. In the28
first line, the first term between parentheses on the right-hand side is the demand for29
4
apples by type C and the second term is the net supply of apples by type A. Likewise,1
in the second line, the first term between parentheses represents the demand for bananas2
by agent A and the second term is the net supply of bananas by type B. The price of3
coconuts is fixed at 1 so there is no price adjustment equation for pC .4
Proposition 1. In a Scarf economy with n ≥ 1 agents of each type, the tatonnement5
process is globally unstable.6
Proof. Consider the Lyapunov function7
L(pA, pB) = 1− pApB exp
(
1− 12p2A − 12p2B
)
It is readily verified that 0 ≤ L ≤ 1 with L = 0 if and only if pA = pB = 1. Moreover,8
using the tatonnement equations of motion we have9
d log(1− L)
dt
=
dpA
dt
( 1
pA
− pA
)
+
dpB
dt
( 1
pB
− pB
)
= 0
In other words, the Lyapunov function is constant over time. The combination of prices10
that yield the same Lyapunov value form closed orbits in (pA, pB)-space, see the left11
panel of Figure 1. So if the process starts with a function value L ̸= 0, then the prices12
cannot converge to the competitive equilibrium where the Lyapunov function takes the13
value 0. Instead, prices cycle in a counter-clockwise manner along the orbit indexed by14
the value of the Lyapunov function at time zero. 15
2.2. Newtonian dynamics in Scarf ’s economy16
Smale (1976a, 1976b) proposes to replace theWalrasian tatonnement process, dp(t)/dt =17
z(p), by the Newtonian dynamic:7,818
dp
dt
= −(∇z(p))−1 z(p)
with ∇z(p) the matrix of partial derivatives of z(p) with respect to p.919
Proposition 2. In a Scarf economy with n ≥ 1 agents of each type, the Newtonian20
dynamic is globally stable.21
7Newton’s method for solving f(x) = 0 for some f : R → R can be recovered by taking a discrete
approximation: xn+1 − xn = −f(xn)/f ′(xn).
8In writing down the global Newton dynamic we assumed that ∇z(p) is everywhere non-singular,
which is true for the Scarf example. Smale (1976b) discusses a more general form of the Newtonian
dynamic that applies also when ∇z(p) is singular.
9Written out in components, (∇z(p))ij = ∂zi(p)/∂pj .
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Figure 1. Predicted price patterns under the tatonnement dynamic (a) and the global Newto-
nian dynamic (b) in the Scarf economy. For the tatonnement model, prices cycle in a counter-
clockwise manner without converging. In contrast, for the Newtonian dynamic, prices converge
exponentially fast to the unique equilibrium (pA, pB) = (1, 1).
Proof. Consider the Lyapunov function1
L(pA, pB) =
( 1
1 + pA
− 1
1 + pA/pB
)2
+
( 1
1 + pB
− 1
1 + pB/pA
)2
Note that 0 ≤ L ≤ 1 and L = 0 if and only if pA = pB = 1. The Newtonian laws of2
motion for the Scarf economy3
dpA
dt
=
pA(1− p2A)(1 + p2B)
(pA + pB)(1− pA)(1− pB) + 4pApB
dpB
dt
=
pB(1− p2B)(1 + p2A)
(pA + pB)(1− pA)(1− pB) + 4pApB
can be used to verify that4
d log(L)
dt
= −2
Hence, the Lyapunov function decreases exponentially over time to its limit value of zero,5
corresponding to the competitive equilibrium (see the right panel of Figure 1). 6
Remark 1. While Proposition 2 is limited to the Scarf economy, a similar argument7
applies to more general economies. Define L = ||z(p)||2 then under the Newtonian8
6
dynamic dL/dt = −2L, i.e. the Lyapunov function is exponentially decreasing. As noted1
by Smale (1976b,a) this observation can be used to prove existence of a competitive2
equilibrium for general environments without having to resort to methods of algebraic3
topology.4
3. Designing a new market mechanism5
Before we turn to the question of how the Newtonian dynamic can be implemented to6
stabilize Scarf’s economy, it is worth briefly discussing why some alternative mechanisms7
do not work. The continuous double auction market has typically been used as the8
standard against which other mechanisms are compared. This is partly because of its9
practical relevance, i.e. most contemporary financial and commodity markets are run10
this way, and partly because of its ability to generate competitive equilibrium outcomes11
in single-commodity markets.10 The experiments of Anderson et al. (2004), however,12
demonstrate that for the multi-market Scarf economy the double auction market does13
not lead to convergence.14
The double auction market is a non-tatonnement institution where trade can occur15
at prices that do not clear the market. Other mechanisms often use some kind of it-16
erative procedure to find prices such that demand equals supply. For example, many17
valuable public assets (e.g. spectrum that can be used for telecommunication services)18
are nowadays sold in some type of ascending English auction. This is a tatonnement-like19
mechanism in that prices increment upwards until there is a unique winner for each item20
(demand equals supply) at which point the items are assigned (trade occurs). Of course,21
prices could also start high and decrement downwards as in the multi-unit Dutch auction22
used to sell flowers in the Netherlands. One could imagine a combination of ascending23
and descending prices. As we explain next, however, none of these tatonnement-like24
mechanisms can be expected to stabilize Scarf’s economy.25
First, consider the tatonnement institution where a Walrasian auctioneer announces26
a set of prices and participants truthfully announce their demands at these prices. If27
there is no excess demand, the participants trade and the process terminates. If there is28
excess demand, the auctioneer adjusts the price of each good in proportion to the excess29
demand for the good and the process continues. For the reasons described in Section30
2.1, prices will not converge to the unique competitive equilibrium of the Scarf economy31
but instead will cycle as shown in Figure 2a.11 Now consider the price adjustment rule32
where the price of a good is increased by a fixed increment if and only if excess demand33
for the good is strictly positive. In such an institution, prices will not converge to the34
competitive equilibrium as illustrated in Figure 2b. Similarly, when the price of a good35
is decreased by a fixed amount if and only if excess demand for the good is strictly36
negative, prices will not converge to the competitive equilibrium as illustrated in Figure37
2c. Finally, for the price adjustment rule where the price of a good is increased by a38
fixed increment if excess demand for the good is strictly positive and decreased by a fixed39
10Convergence in single-commodity markets occurs under a wide variety of conditions, see e.g. Smith
(1962), Friedman (1984), and Smith (2010).
11See Smith et al. (1982) and Plott and George (1992) for experimental evidence on the Walrasian
auctioneer mechanism.
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Figure 2. Predicted price dynamics in the Scarf economy under various tatonnement-like
institutions: (a) the Walrasian auctioneer, (b) the ascending English auction, (c) the descending
Dutch auction, and (d) a combination of the Dutch and English auction. The prices of A and
B are plotted in terms of the numeraire PC = 1. The competitive equilibrium is labelled ‘CE’.
Each plot is divided into four quadrants. The indicator arrows show the effect of excess demand
on price in each quadrant.
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amount if excess demand for the good is strictly negative, prices will also not converge1
as illustrated in Figure 2d.2
To summarize, commonly used market institutions do not guarantee convergence3
in Scarf’s economy. Our novel design is motivated by the work of the mathematician4
Stephen Smale on “global Newton” methods. Smale (1976a; 1976b) proposes an alterna-5
tive to the tatonnement dynamic that is convergent under general conditions, including6
those defined by the Scarf economy. The main question is how to design a market where7
prices converge.12 One could introduce a “Newtonian auctioneer” who (i) announces8
prices, (ii) elicits agents’ demands, and (iii) adjusts prices given reported excess de-9
mands according to the global Newton method.13 One complication is that the Newton10
method requires information not only about excess demands but also about their deriva-11
tives. In addition, an iterative procedure is potentially time consuming and strategically12
complex. We solve both issues by letting agents submit demand schedules, i.e. a list of13
quantities demanded at various prices, and then determine the terms of trade by running14
an automated version of the iterative process (i)–(iii). There are a range of optimization15
procedures, including the Newtonian dynamic, that could be used to find market clearing16
prices providing they have the required stability properties.14 Because submitting entire17
schedules is more complex and more time consuming than submitting single orders, we18
consider a call market that is cleared at prespecified times rather than continuously.1519
3.1. The schedule market20
In general terms, the schedule market works as follows. Each participant i reports21
their excess demand as a function of price zi(p). Reported demands are aggregated to22
produce an excess demand function z(p) = Σizi(p). Prices p
∗ are computed such that23
supply equals demand for all goods.1624
To ensure uniqueness of the market clearing prices, some restrictions are placed on25
the admissible demand schedules. Recall that in Scarf’s economy each type of agent26
derives utility from two of the three goods and is endowed with one of the goods they27
like. As shown in Table 1, if a type needs good X and has good Y , they submit a28
schedule specifying the quantity of X demanded at various prices of X relative to Y . Let29
the demand schedule be denoted by DXY : R+ 7→ R+, which is a mapping from strictly30
12The global instability observed in the experiments conducted by Anderson et al. (2004) indicates
that the Newtonian dynamic is not at play in the double auction market institution. In a related set
of double auction market experiments, Hirota et al. 2005 report that they find no support for the
Newtonian model.
13Newton’s classical method of iteration corresponds to a discrete approximation to Smale’s adjustment
process.
14Notice that a Walraisan Clearing House (Friedman and Rust, 1993, p. 9) where traders submit
demand schedules but a tatonnement dynamic is applied to the resultant aggregate demand function
would not help. Eliciting demand using schedules rather than iteratively does not solve the instability
problem.
15McCabe et al. (1990) found that call market based institutions can be highly efficient. Friedman
(1993) compares the continuous double auction to a call market institution and finds they produce similar
efficiency levels.
16In the experiment, participants only report demand at a finite set of prices and interpolation is used
to estimate demand at intermediate prices. The interpolation method is described in Section 4.2.
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positive prices to strictly positive quantities. The following restrictions are applied to1
the submitted demand schedules.172
(D) If p1 < p2 then DXY (p1) ≥ DXY (p2).3
(I) If p1 < p2 then p1DXY (p1) < p2DXY (p2).4
The first restriction states that demand schedules are non-increasing. The second re-5
striction states that demand is inelastic, i.e. the amount spent on a good rises with its6
price. We say a schedule is admissible if it satisfies properties (D) and (I). It is readily7
verified that admissibility is preserved under aggregation. In particular, let A be any set8
of admissible demand schedules and let DA : R+ 7→ R+ denote the aggregate demand9
schedule DA(p) =
∑
D∈AD(p). Then DA satisfies (D) and (I).10
Define SYX(q) = qD
−1
XY (q) where DXY is admissible. One can think of SYX(q) as the11
amount of Y being supplied when q number of units of X are demanded. Since DXY is12
admissible, SYX(q) is a decreasing function.
18 Consider the aggregate demand schedules13
of the three types of agents, DBA, DCB , and DAC , with associated supply functions,14
SAB , SBC , and SCA.15
Proposition 3. If the schedules submitted to the schedule market are admissible, then16
the amount of each good traded is uniquely determined. If trade occurs, then the price of17
each good is also uniquely determined.18
Proof. Define SA(q) = SAB(SBC(SCA(q))). Admissibility implies each of the supply19
functions is decreasing, so SA(x) is decreasing. Hence, if SA has a fixed point, S(qA) = qA,20
it is unique. This fixed point corresponds to the quantity of A traded. (If SA has no21
fixed point, no trade occurs.) The amount of C being traded equals qC = SCA(qA) since22
qC = SCA(qA) = SCA(SA(qA)) = SCA(SAB(SBC(SCA(qA)))) = SC(SCA(qA)) = SC(qC),23
i.e. qC is the unique fixed point of SC . A similar logic shows that the amount of B24
traded equals qB = SBC(qC). Finally, if positive amounts of the goods are traded, prices25
are pA = qC/qA and pB = qC/qB . 26
What constitutes an optimal admissible schedule given the schedules submitted by oth-27
ers? If an agent who demands X and supplies Y takes the relative price p = pX/pY as28
given, the optimal schedule is1929
DXY (p) =
1
1 + p
17One might think a unique equilibrium could be achieved by restricting demand to be a decreasing
function and supply to be an increasing function. Unfortunately, this would not allow traders to express
their true preferences, because income effects in the Scarf economy result in downward sloping supply
curves. The (D) and (I) admissiblity restrictions allow traders to express their true preferences while
ruling out multiple equilibria.
18Evaluating S′YX(q) at q = DXY (p) where p = pX/pY yields p+DXY (p)/D
′
XY (p), which is negative
by the assumption of inelastic downward sloping demand.
19Maximizing min(qX , qY ) over the budget set pqX + qY ≤ 1 yields q∗X = q∗Y = 1/(1 + p).
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Type utility supplies demands submits schedule
A min(qA, qB) A B DBA(pB/pA)
B min(qB , qC) B C DCB(1/pB)
C min(qC , qA) C A DAC(pA)
Table 1. The three types of agents in Scarf’s economy and the types of schedules they can
submit.
which is admissible. Call this the competitive schedule. The associated supply function1
is SYX(q) = 1− q, which is intuitive since if 1− q units of Y are supplied for q units of X2
then the agent ends up with equal amounts of X and Y thus maximizing min(qX , qY ).3
Given the market-clearing price generally depends on the schedules submitted, is4
submitting a competitive schedule a best response? We find, surprisingly, it is a weakly5
dominant strategy. To explore this further consider an example of the Scarf economy6
with only one agent of each type.7
Example 1. Suppose the type-B and type-C agents submit schedules DCB(p) =8
DAC(p) = p
−α, which are non-competitive but admissible if 0 < α < 1. It is readily9
verified that SBC(q) = SCA(q) = q
(α−1)/α so that the supply function that the type-A10
agent faces is given by11
SBA(q) = q
(α−1α )
2
which is increasing. If the type-A agent submits a competitive schedule she will end up12
with equal quantities qA = qB = q
∗ where q∗ is the unique equilibrium quantity that13
solves 1 − q = SBA(q). If she submits a schedule that gives her qB < q∗ in equilibrium14
then she is obviously worse off. Suppose she submits a schedule that gives her qB > q
∗
15
in equilibrium. Then she is better off only if also qA > q
∗, i.e. if she has to supply less16
than 1− q∗ units of A. But since SBA(q) is increasing, others supply more B only if they17
get more A. Hence, for a type-A agent to get more than q∗ units of B she would have18
to supply more than 1− q∗ units of A. It is thus optimal for the type-A agent to submit19
a competitive schedule even though others submit non-competitive schedules. 20
Remark 2. In the example, the supply function SBA(q) represents the amount of B21
others are willing to give if they get q units of A. Writing the supply of B as a function22
of the amount of A taken simplifies the argument for why a competitive schedule is23
optimal. But the supply function can also easily be expressed in terms of the relative24
price, p = pB/pA. From pBSBA(qA) = pAqA it follows that qA = p
α2/(2α−1) so25
SBA(p) = p
(α−1)2
2α−1
which is increasing for α > 12 , flat for α =
1
2 , and decreasing when α <
1
2 . The argument26
that submitting a competitive schedule is optimal now follows from the fact that the27
elasticity of supply is less than −1 when it is decreasing. This implies that when the28
type-A agent submits a schedule that gives her more B, she will have to pay more units29
of A for it. 30
11
In Example 1, the argument that a competitive schedule is optimal for the type-A agent1
does not depend on the particular functional form of others’ schedules but only on the2
fact that others’ supply is increasing, which is more generally true if we impose admissi-3
bility.4
Proposition 4. In a Scarf economy with n ≥ 1 agents of each type, submitting a compet-5
itive schedule is a weakly dominant strategy when schedules are restricted to be admissible.6
Proof. Label the type-A agents by i = 1, . . . , n. Suppose there is a schedule D′BA(p) ̸=7
(1+p)−1 that gives some type-A agent, denoted i, a higher utility than submitting a com-8
petitive schedule. Admissibility implies that the supply function SBA(q) = SBC(SCA(q))9
is increasing. When agent i submits a competitive schedule she will end up with equal10
quantities of A and B. By assumption, when agent i submits D′BA she has a higher11
utility, so agent i must end up with more A and more B. This means that agent i must12
have given less A and taken more B, so the price of A in terms of B was higher. Since13
other type-A agents all face the same price, this implies that they must also have taken14
more B and given less A. But this contradicts the fact that SBA is increasing. Analogous15
arguments apply to agents of other types. 16
Without the admissibility restriction, the result does not hold; however all agents sub-17
mitting competitive schedules is a Nash equilibrium (see Appendix A).18
The fact that each agent faces a flat supply curve is due to the specific parametrization19
of the Scarf economy. However, in large economies this would be the case for arbitrary20
specifications of preferences and endowments. In this sense, Proposition 4 applies more21
generally when the economy grows large.22
To explore the robustness of the mechanism, we consider a repeated market setting23
where agents submit schedules that are best responses to the previously observed prices24
but not necessarily best responses to all possible prices. Denote the previous observed25
prices as pt−1. Consider the following schedule where α ∈ [0,∞]:26
DˆXY (pt−1, p) =
pt−1 + α
p+ α
× 1
1 + pt−1
Notice that DˆXY (pt−1, pt−1) = 11+pt−1 for all values of α. Hence, the schedule is a best27
response to the previously observed price pt−1. When α = 1, DˆXY (pt−1, p) corresponds28
to the competitive schedule. When α = 0, DˆXY (pt−1, p) is the “flattest” admissible29
schedule that is a best response to pt−1 while DˆXY (pt−1, p) limits to the vertical sched-30
ule that is a best response to pt−1 when α→∞. The next proposition shows that when31
agents submit such best response schedules, prices converge to the unique competitive32
equilibrium for any α ≥ 0, see Appendix B for a proof.33
Proposition 5. In a repeated Scarf economy with any value of α and starting from any34
prices p0, if agents of type A, B, and C submit schedules DˆBA(pt−1, p), DˆCB(pt−1, p),35
and DˆAC(pt−1, p) respectively, then prices will converge to the unique competitive equi-36
librium of the economy over successive periods.37
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Original Scarf economy Experimental economy
Type Utility Endowment Utility Endowment
A min(qA, qB) (1, 0, 0) 40min(qA/10, qB/20) (10, 0, 0)
B min(qB , qC) (0, 1, 0) 40min(qB/20, qC/400) (0, 20, 0)
C min(qC , qA) (0, 0, 1) 40min(qC/400, qA/10) (0, 0, 400)
Table 2. Adaptation of Scarf’s original economy for the experiment.
This result shows that the schedule market is somewhat forgiving to deviations from1
submitting competitive schedules and that convergence to the unique competitive equi-2
librium of the Scarf economy over successive periods can occur even with myopic behavior.3
4. Experimental design and procedures4
Since one of the goals of the experiment is to replicate Anderson et al.’s (2004)5
results, we use their (treatment I) parametrization for the Scarf economy. The utility6
functions and endowments are adapted from those originally used by Scarf as shown in7
Table 2 below. In Scarf’s economy, each agent is endowed with a single unit. In the8
experiment, this single unit is replaced with multiple units and the utility functions are9
scaled accordingly. The most numerous good, C, was used as a numeraire and was called10
“cash” in the experiment. After scaling, the competitive equilibrium prices in terms of11
cash are 40 for good A and 20 for good B.12
There were two treatments: the continuous double auction and the schedule market.13
A total of 180 subjects participated in the experiment. There were 12 sessions with14
one group of 15 subjects per session and six sessions per treatment. In a group, five15
subjects were assigned to each of the three types. Subjects were given the endowments16
and utility functions shown in Table 2 and were told that they would be paid the value of17
their holdings after trading, where the value was calculated using their utility functions.18
There were three unpaid practice periods and 15 paid periods.20 At the start of each19
period, endowments were refreshed, no goods were carried over from one period to the20
next.21
At the beginning of the experiment, the instructions were presented using PowerPoint22
and a paper handout. The instructions included worked examples with Leontief prefer-23
ences to help subjects understand the induced preferences, and were followed up with a24
short comprehension test. During the experiment, payoff calculations were performed by25
the software so that subjects could focus on trading.21 During the three unpaid practice26
periods subjects were encouraged to ask questions. An exchange rate of 0.15 Swiss Francs27
per util was used. The mean payment was 48.74 Francs including a 10 Franc showup fee.28
The experiment took around 1.5 hours to complete.29
20The double auction market Session 2 lasted for only ten periods because of a computer crash.
21The user interface for both market mechanisms was tailored to Leontief preferences, but it could
easily be adjusted to accommodate more general preferences over a pair of goods. For instance, if
constant elasticity of substitution utility functions were used, the ‘Unused’ columns could be replaced
by columns showing the marginal utility of each good.
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4.1. Continuous double auction implementation1
A screenshot of the continuous double auction interface is shown in Figure 3. The left-2
hand side of the screen shows the subject’s utility function, current holdings, and current3
pay-off. It is also used to construct orders. The right-hand side shows a list of submitted4
orders, some of which have already transacted. Subjects could submit limit orders to buy5
and sell the commodities A and B with cash used as the medium of exchange. The price6
of the last transaction was displayed but subjects could submit orders with any price.7
As subjects entered figures specifying terms of the order, the payoff consequences of the8
order were displayed. Transactions occurred as soon as a set of compatible orders had9
been submitted. Partial filling of orders was allowed. Subjects could cancel or amend10
orders that had been submitted but had not yet transacted. There was no constraint on11
the number of orders submitted or the number of transactions. However, subjects could12
not offer to trade more than they had available. After four minutes had elapsed, the13
period ended. Subjects were shown a ‘results screen’ with their earnings for the period,14
a list of the trades they made, and their total earnings from all completed periods.15
Figure 3. User interface for the continuous double auction market. The screen is from the
point of view of a type-C agent who was endowed with cash and needs cash and good A. On the
top left of the screen, the text beginning ‘Payoff Formula’ shows the subject’s utility function
and the value of the current holdings. Below this is a table with labeled rows for each of the
goods. The column headed ‘Price’ shows the last trade price, ‘Holdings’ are the current holdings,
‘Available’ are current holdings which the subject is not currently offering to trade, ‘Unused’ are
the current holdings that are not contributing towards earnings, and ‘Excess’ indicates similar
information in words (in the screen shot, the subject has too much cash and not enough of good
A, so can increase earnings by trading cash for good A). The columns ‘I give’ and ‘I take’ are
used to construct orders. This is done by entering numbers in the columns. As numbers are
entered, the ‘Added Value’ number automatically updates to show how earnings will change if
the order transacts. The table on the right hand side shows the orders that have been submitted.
There are currently two active orders. Trader 1 is offering to sell good B at a price of 25. Trader
2 (labeled ‘Me’) is offering to buy good A at a price of 45. There has been one transaction, the
current subject bought three units of good A.
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4.2. Schedule market implementation1
A screenshot of the schedule market interface is shown in Figure 4a. Subjects con-2
structed a schedule by specifying how much they wanted to trade at each of a range of3
prices. The range of prices was pre-determined and constant throughout the experiment.4
The admissability restrictions were enforced automatically. When the subject changed5
their demand at one price, if the restrictions were not satisfied, the computer adjusted6
demands at other prices to satisfy the restrictions. For example, if demand was initially7
zero at every price and the subject set demand at the highest price to one, the computer8
would automatically set the demand at all lower prices to one to satisfy admissibility.9
Interpolation was used to produce a continuous demand function from the quantities10
specified by subjects at each of the pre-specified prices. Suppose a subject is endowed11
with good A and demands good B. They specify their demand for B at pre-specified12
prices, giving a list of (p, qB) pairs. This is converted to a list of (p, qA) pairs where13
qA = qBp. Then the following interpolation is performed. Given two price-supply points14
(p1, qA1) and (p2, qA2), intermediate points are (p1α+p2(1−α), qA1α+qA2(1−α)) where15
α ∈ [0, 1]. Interpolation is carried out using price-supply pairs rather than price demand16
pairs so that intermediate points satisfy the admissibility conditions that ensures a unique17
equilibrium. The interpolation was performed as subjects were entering the schedule and18
subjects could see the interpolated points on the graphical representation of the schedule19
before they submitted it. Although subjects could not directly specify demand at every20
possible price, they could do so indirectly. For example, suppose a subject wanted to21
demand a certain quantity at price 7, but the nearest pre-specified prices were 5 and 10.22
By suitable adjustment of the quantities demanded at 5 and 10, they could specify the23
desired quantity at price 7.24
A period ended if all schedules had been submitted or if four minutes had elapsed.25
The submitted schedules were summed to produce an aggregate demand function. A26
numerical optimization procedure was applied to the aggregate demand function to find27
the market clearing prices. Trade occurred at these prices with each agent trading the28
quantities specified by their submitted schedule. Figure 4b shows the ‘results screen’ from29
the schedule market shown after the period ended. Subjects were shown the demand30
schedule they had submitted and the residual supply that they faced (the combinations31
of price and quantity taken by the subject that would equalize supply and demand in all32
markets).33
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Figure 4a. User interface for the schedule market. The left-hand side of the screen shows the
subject’s endowment, utility function, and a table that can be used to create demand schedules.
The first column of the table is a fixed list of possible prices of the commodity that the subject
needs in terms of the commodity with which the subject is endowed. In this case, the subject
needs commodity A and has cash, so the price column shows the price of A measured in cash.
The subject’s task is to fill in numbers in the ‘Take’ column, representing their demand at each
of the prices. As subjects enter numbers, the displayed graph and the relevant numbers in the
table (the columns labeled ‘Give’, ‘Holdings’, ‘Unused’, and ‘Value’) are automatically updated
to reflect their choices. The ‘Give’ column indicates how much subjects will give up for what
they want to take at the specified price. The ‘Holdings’ column shows holdings after trading at
each price. The ‘Unused’ column indicates whether any of the holdings will be unused, i.e. not
contribute towards the subject’s payoff. The ‘Value’ column shows the utility of the holdings at
each price. The ‘Undo’ button lets subjects revert to previous states of the schedule, making it
easy to correct mistakes and to experiment with different configurations. Once the subject had
finished editing the schedule, they pressed ‘Submit’. Once submitted, schedules could no longer
be altered.
The right-hand side of the screen shows a graphical representation of the schedule being con-
structed. It shows the quantities chosen at each of the listed prices and the interpolated quan-
tities at intermediate prices. The green dot indicates the point being edited on the left-hand
side (currently p = 4.44 and q = 7.25). The dotted curved grid lines represent the admissibility
constraint. For a schedule to be admissible, as q increases, a schedule can only go to a lower
grid line.
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Figure 4b. Results screen for the schedule market. The curve labeled ‘Demand’ is the demand
schedule submitted by the subject. The curve labeled ‘Supply’ is the residual supply the subject
faces. At each point on the residual supply curve, excess demand is zero in all markets. The
intersection of the demand and supply curves yields the market equilibrium for the submitted
schedules. The text on the left shows prices, quantities traded, holdings after trading, and
payoffs. Subjects could also see what would have happened if they had submitted a different
schedule. They could do this by moving the mouse pointer to any location in the graph. The
text on the top right would then be automatically updated to show the potential payoffs at the
position of the mouse pointer.
5. Results1
We compare the two market institutions in terms of price stability (Section 5.1),2
as well as in terms of efficiency (Section 5.2) and equality (Section 5.3). A detailed3
comparison of the price dynamics observed in our double auction experiments to those4
of the Anderson et al. (2004) study can be found in the Appendix.5
5.1. Price dynamics in the two market institutions6
The between-period prices observed in our double auction market experiments are7
shown in the top six panels of Figure 5, where each panel corresponds to a different8
session. In each session, prices start in the lower-left corner in the first period of the9
experiment and then cycle in a counter-clockwise pattern without any obvious tendency10
for convergence. We thus replicate this main finding of the Anderson et al. (2004) paper,11
see their Figure 4. Besides counter-clockwise cycling, the observed price paths confirm12
other features of the tatonnement predictions in Figure 1a. For instance, the further the13
price of good B falls below its equilibrium level the further the price for good A shoots14
17
α1 α2 α3 α4 α5 α6 β
D.A 0.68∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗ −0.80∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.31 0.041
(0.23) (0.16) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.021)
Schedule −2.13∗∗∗ −2.30∗∗∗ −2.79∗∗∗ −2.70∗∗∗ −2.56∗∗∗ −2.59∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗
(0.08) (0.15) (0.13) (0.22) (0.21) (0.13) (0.011)
Table 3. Estimating the time dependence of the Lyapunov function. Values of the Lyapunov
function were calculated with prices normalized so that the competitive equilibrium is (1, 1). A
negative/zero/positive β corresponds to prices converging/cycling/diverging. The estimated β is
not significantly different from 0 for the double auction market, which indicates that prices cycle.
For the schedule market the estimated β is negative, which indicates convergence. Standard
errors (robust and without clustering) are in parentheses; ∗ indicates p < 0.05, ∗∗ indicates
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ indicates p < 0.001,
out and the less the price path looks like a circle. Compare, for instance, the first and1
fourth double auction sessions in Figure 5.2
Result 1. Prices in the double auction market do not converge to their3
competitive equilibrium levels.4
Support. To test whether prices are converging to equilibrium we evaluate the Lyapunov5
function of Section 2.1 along the observed price paths. Consider a simple regression model6
of the form7
L = Φ(αs + β(period− 1) + ε) (1)
where L is the Lyapunov function and Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distri-8
bution.22 The session-specific constant αs corresponds to the path’s starting point (i.e.9
the trade price in the first period). The parameter β measures stability: β < 0 implies10
convergence, β > 0 implies divergence, and β = 0 means that the prices are cycling11
along a closed path. The estimation results for the double auction market are shown in12
the top row of Table 3. The estimated β coefficient is not significantly different from 0,13
indicating that there is no convergence to equilibrium but that, on average, prices cycle14
along a closed path as the tatonnement model predicts for the Scarf economy. 15
The price patterns observed in the schedule market sessions are shown in the bottom six16
panels of Figure 5. The most striking difference is the absence of any cycling tenden-17
cies. The introduction of schedules has stabilized prices, which are close to competitive18
equilibrium levels.19
Result 2. Prices in the schedule market converge to their competitive equi-20
librium levels.21
Support. We apply the regression in (Equation 1) to the Lyapunov function in Section22
2.2. The estimated β coefficient is significantly negative for the schedule market, see23
22We introduce this transformation because the Lyapunov function is bounded between 0 and 1 so a
simple linear regression would not be appropriate.
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Figure 5. Between-period prices in the double-auction market sessions (top six panels) and
the schedule market sessions (bottom six panels). Prices cycle in a counter-clockwise manner in
the double auction markets and converge straight to equilibrium in the schedule markets.
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Figure 6. Price evolution in double auction market Session 4 (top) and schedule market
Session 3 (bottom). The dotted lines show the competitive equilibrium price for each good. All
15 periods of the experiment are shown, each lasting 4 minutes as indicated by the thin vertical
lines. Prices in the double auction market oscillate with substantial intra-period variation. In
contrast, prices in the schedule market are steady and close to their competitive equilibrium
values.
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the bottom row of Table 3. Note, however, that the coefficient is rather small. The1
reason is that even in the first period of the experiment, prices are in the vicinity of2
the equilibrium so there is limited scope for further convergence. Notice that the values3
for α are lower in the schedules treatments indicating different initial conditions across4
treatments. Another measure of convergence is provided by Anderson et al. (2004) who5
define prices to be close to equilibrium if they fall in the range (pA, pB) ∈ [36.5, 43.5] ×6
[16.5, 23.5]. Taking averages over all 15 periods in each of the six sessions that used7
the schedule market, the observed average prices for good A are: 43.6(1.1), 39.5(1.7),8
38.6(0.6), 41.2(1.5), 41.3(2.3), 39.2(1.1), with the standard error in parentheses, and for9
good B they are: 28.2(1.1), 22.4 (1.4), 20.3(0.7), 21.0(0.8), 20.6(0.8), 20.5(0.9). Except10
for the first session, observed average prices are all close to the equilibrium. The overall11
price averages over all six sessions are pA = 40.6(0.6) and pB = 22.2(0.5). 12
The stark difference in price evolution under the two different market mechanisms is13
illustrated in Figure 6. The top panel shows the observed trade prices in one of the14
sessions that used the double auction market. Trade prices for all 15 periods are shown,15
where each period lasted four minutes as indicated by the thin vertical lines, for a total16
time of 60 minutes. The trade prices oscillate with substantial intra-period variation.17
The pattern of the oscillations suggests that when one price crosses its equilibrium value18
the other price is furthest from its equilibrium value, as the tatonnement model predicts19
(see Figure 1a). The bottom panel shows observed trade prices in the schedule market,20
using the same scale for the axes to emphasize the lack of price variability under this21
mechanism. Trade prices start close to their equilibrium values and remain close for the22
entire duration of the experiment.23
The tatonnement model makes more specific predictions than the non-convergence24
Result 1. For instance, it predicts that prices move along a closed orbit in a counter-25
clockwise manner. More specifically, for any pair of prices, the tatonnement model26
makes a precise prediction for the direction of price changes. An alternative prediction27
is that prices converge along a straight path to the competitive equilibrium. Figure 728
shows how well these two alternatives predict the actual direction of price changes for29
the double auction (top two panels) and schedule market (bottom two panels). The30
histograms are based on the difference between the predicted and observed angles of31
price changes.23 There is a big spike at 0 degrees for the tatonnement model in the32
double auction market, and a similar spike at 0 degrees for the convergence model in33
the schedule market. Applying the convergence model to the double auction market, or34
the tatonnement model to the schedule market, results in spikes at ±90 degrees in line35
with the counter-clockwise cycling behavior predicted by the tatonnement model and36
observed in the double auction market.37
Result 3. The direction of price changes in the double auction market is well38
predicted by the tatonnement model. In the schedule market, prices converge39
to the competitive equilibrium along a straight path.40
23Angles were calculated using prices normalized so that the competitive equilibrium is (1, 1). Errors
are measured in the clockwise direction. If the predicted direction is north and the observed direction
is north east, the error is +45 degrees. If the predicted direction is north and the observed direction is
west, the error is -90 degrees.
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Figure 7. Prediction errors for the simple convergence model (left panels) and the tatonnement
model (right panels) in the double auction market (top panels) and the schedule market (bottom
panels). For the double auction market, the tatonnement model produces a big spike at zero
degrees (no error) while the simple convergence model does the same for the schedule market.
Support. Consider the following simple regression, which explains price movements in1
the A and B markets in terms of excess demand, as the tatonnement model predicts,2
and straight convergence:3
pA(t+ 1)− pA(t) = βtat zA(pA(t), pB(t)) + βconv(p∗A − pA(t)) + εA
pB(t+ 1)− pB(t) = βtat zB(pA(t), pB(t)) + βconv(p∗B − pB(t)) + εB
The results are shown in Table 4. Note that only βtat is different from 0 in the double4
auction market while only βconv is different from 0 in the schedule market. 5
For additional analysis concerning price dynamics in the double auction market we refer6
the reader to the Appendix, which compares our results to those of the Anderson et al.7
(2004) study who used only the double auction market. As discussed in the Appendix,8
we replicate all the findings that pertain to their “cycling ” treatment I that we used9
for our double auction market experiments. Our main interest is in comparing the two10
market institutions, in particular, how price (in)stability affects outcomes in terms of11
efficiency and equality.12
22
βtat βconv
Double Auction 0.564∗∗∗ 0.021
(0.067) (0.013)
Schedule −0.183 0.681∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.079)
Table 4. Explaining the direction of price changes using the tatonnement model and a model
of straight convergence. In the double auction market, price changes are driven only by excess
demands as the tatonnement model predicts. Prices in the schedule market are not affected by
excess demands but instead converge along a straight line to the equilibrium. Prices are normal-
ized so that the competitive equilibrium is (1, 1) and excess demand for a good is normalized by
dividing by the total quantity of that good in the economy. Standard errors are in parentheses;
∗∗∗ indicates p < 0.001.
5.2. The effects of price (in)stability on market performance1
This section models the allocations and hence welfare that results from trading at non-2
equilibrium prices. In a tatonnement institution, an auctioneer adjusts prices in response3
to reported demands and no trade takes place until market-clearing prices are found. For4
the Scarf economy this implies that no trade ever takes place. Our double auction market5
experiments, however, show that there is substantial trade at non-equilibrium prices. A6
variant of the model proposed by Hahn and Negishi (1962) can be used to model out-7
of-equilibrium trade. Assume that traders are price-takers and exchange goods in fixed8
ratios determined by the prices until they hold equal proportions of the goods they want.9
Of course, if prices are out of equilibrium, not all traders are able to achieve a balanced10
portfolio of the goods they want. The market does not clear and some traders are left11
with “unused” goods. However, traders of at least one type will have goods in the desired12
proportions, making the outcome Pareto optimal and hence no further trade possible.13
To derive predictions for the price-taking model, consider the original Scarf economy14
of Section 2. Let (pA, pB , pC = 1) denote the price vector and let (qA, qB , qC) denote the15
quantities traded at these prices.16
Proposition 6. For the original Scarf economy, the price-taking model predicts that the17
quantities traded are18
qA = min
( supply︷ ︸︸ ︷pB
pA + pB
,
demand︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
1 + pA
)
qB = min
( demand︷ ︸︸ ︷pA
pA + pB
,
supply︷ ︸︸ ︷
pA
pB + pApB
,
cash︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
1 + pB
)
(2)
and the resulting welfare is19
W = qB +min (1− qB , qApA) + qA
23
Welfare is maximized at the competitive equilibrium prices, pA = pB = 1.1
In the market for A, type A sells good A to type C. Type C pays using cash from their2
endowment. When prices are taken as given, there are two constraints on the quantity3
of A traded: type A’s demand and type C’s supply. In the market for B, type B sells4
good B to type A. Type A has no cash in their endowment so must use cash from sales5
in market A to fund purchases in market B. When prices are taken as given, there are6
three constraints on the quantity of B traded: type A’s demand, type B’s supply, and7
type A’s cash receipts from market A. The quantity of cash traded in each market can8
be simply calculated using the prices and quantities. 249
Welfare is taken to be the sum of each type’s utility. The motivation for this for-10
mulation, given that in the Scarf economy preferences are not quasi linear, is as follows.11
First, given the symmetry between agent’s utility functions it seems natural to give the12
utilities of different types equal weight. Second, it corresponds with subject’s earnings13
in the experiment. The utilities are calculated as follows. Type A’s utility is simply the14
quantity of good B traded. Type B’s utility is the minimum of B’s holdings of good B15
after trading and the amount of cash type B can receive from selling good B. Finally,16
type C’s utility is the quantity of good A traded.17
We define market efficiency as the fraction of the total gains from trade that are18
realized:19
efficiency =
Wobserved
Wmax
The two panels of Figure 8 show (a) the observed quantities traded and (b) the observed20
efficiency levels for the double auction market sessions against the predictions of the21
price taking model. The predictions are based on Proposition 6 using the opening prices22
for the period: in the first period the opening prices are (pA = 20, pB = 10), i.e. half23
the equilibrium prices, and in later periods the opening prices are equal to the average24
trading prices in the prior period. For the efficiency levels, the small diamonds correspond25
to period averages and the large diamonds to session averages. The price-taking model26
predicts efficiency levels remarkably well.25 This is especially true for the six session27
averages, which are all very close to the 45-degree line.2628
Observed efficiency levels in the double auction market range from 65% to 91% with29
more observations towards the lower end. The lower bound should come as no surprise30
since even if prices are completely off the predicted welfare is Wmin = 1, see Proposition31
6, corresponding to an efficiency level of 67%.2732
24The predictions of the model can be thought of as the rest point of a dynamic system where each
agent attempts the locally optimal trade taking prices as given. This is similar to the Local Marshallian
Equilibrium theory proposed by Asparouhova et al. (2011) but with prices fixed. That is, agent i with
utility function ui, and a vector of holdings ωi attempts to trade in the direction defined by the vector
di that solves argmax
di
∇ui(ωi) ·di subject to di ·p = 0 and di+ωi being a feasible allocation. When
starting from the Scarf economy endowments, there is one agent supplying and demanding each of the
goods and trade can continue until one agent achieves goods in the desired proportions.
25The coefficient for correlation between the predicted and observed period averages is 0.770 (p <
0.0001).
26Two sessions resulted in almost identical and observed efficiency levels, which is why it appears as
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Figure 8. Observed and predicted quantities traded and efficiency levels in the double auction
market. The predictions are based on a model of optimizing behavior taking prices as given,
with the prices being equal to the opening prices for the period. The opening prices are set to
half the equilibrium prices in the first period and to the average trade prices of the previous
period in later periods.
Result 4. In the double auction market, observed efficiency is 77%. In the1
schedule market, observed efficiency is significantly higher: 95%.2
Support. Efficiency levels for the six schedule market sessions are 89.6%, 92.8%, 96.4%,3
97.6%, 97.7%, 96.6%, and for the double auction market sessions they are 77.1%, 73.5%,4
72.0%, 86.6%, 71.7%, 81.5%. Note that all six efficiency levels for the schedule market5
are higher, so the null hypothesis that efficiency levels are the same can be rejected6
(p = 0.0022, Median test). 7
We next determine how the total gains from trade are divided among the different types8
of agents.9
5.3. The effects of price (in)stability on equality10
Using the price-taking model of Proposition 6 together with the opening prices for the11
period we can predict the gains from trade by agent type in the double auction market.12
if there are only five large filled diamonds.
27If all goods are randomly assigned to one type of trader, predicted efficiency is Wmin = 1. A stricter
definition of efficiency that corrects for this baseline level would be
normalized efficiency =
Wobserved −Wmin
Wmax −Wmin
The normalized efficiency of the double auction market is 31% and that of the schedule market 85%.
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Figure 9. Observed and predicted gains for each agent type in the double auction market. The
predictions are based on a model of optimizing behavior taking prices as given and equal to the
opening prices for the period. The opening prices are half the equilibrium prices in the first
period and the average trade prices of the previous period in later periods.
Figure 9 compares these predictions (horizontal axis) with the observed gains (vertical1
axis). The price-taking model also does a good job at predicting gains by agent type,2
although the observed gains for the type-A agent are somewhat lower than predicted3
while the gains for the type-C agent are somewhat higher than predicted.4
To explain this discrepancy, note that the outcomes in Proposition 6 are derived5
without taking into account the precise details of the trading institution. It is as if the6
type-A and type-C agents can exchange good A, type-A and type-B agents exchange7
good B, and type-B and type-C agents exchange good C. As a result, the type-A agent,8
for instance, would never be left with any excess cash. But in the double auction market,9
the type-A agent first has to trade with the type-C agent to acquire cash with which10
she can then buy good B from the type-B agent. And if the type-A agent overestimates11
how much of good B will be supplied she may be left with excess cash at the end of the12
period. Note that the other two agent types do not face this problem since they only13
trade one type of good. The type-B and type-C agents can simply keep trading until14
(i) they have as much of the good they demand as the good they are endowed with, in15
which case they have no unused goods or (ii) they hit the limit of the supply of the good16
they demand, in which case they are left with unused units of the good they are endowed17
with.18
This intuition is confirmed by Figure 10, which shows for each agent type the amount19
of unused goods (normalized by the total quantity of the good in the economy) averaged20
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Figure 10. Unused units of each of the three goods by agent type (normalized by the total
amount of each good in the economy). The bars show the mean and its standard error. The
type-B and type-C agents have unused units only of the goods they demand while the type-A
agent has unused units of all three goods.
over all periods and sessions that used the double auction market. The type-B and1
type-C agents have unused units only of the good they demand while the type-A agent2
has unused units of all three goods. Because the type-A agent must first trade with the3
type-C agent to get cash not knowing how much of good B she will be able to buy with4
that cash, she faces the most uncertainty and, hence, the most difficult task in achieving5
a balanced portfolio, especially since prices fluctuate within a period. This explains why6
the type-A agent’s gains are somewhat lower then predicted (as indicated by the circles7
in Figure 9). The tendency of type-A agents to stock up on too much cash benefits8
the type-C agent, which explains why their observed gains are somewhat higher than9
predicted (as indicated by the squares in Figure 9).10
Notwithstanding these small discrepancies, Figure 9 does a remarkable job at ex-11
plaining the division of the total gains from trade. The most striking feature of Figure 9,12
however, is the large variation of gains across agent types. The shares that the type-B13
agents get (indicated by the squares) are all in the lower-left corner while the shares for14
the type-A agents (diamonds) are in the upper-right corner and the shares of the type-C15
agents (circles) are somewhere in the middle. The degree of inequality in the double16
auction markets is even more clear from Figure 11, which shows the shares by agent type17
over time in the double auction market sessions (top six panels) and the schedule market18
sessions (bottom six panels).28 The white space at the top of each panel indicates the19
degree to which there was a loss in efficiency.20
Result 5. The double auction market results in large inequalities. In con-21
trast, the schedule market results in approximately equal payoffs.22
Support. The division of the total gains from trade among the three types of agent23
28Recall that in the double auction market Session 2 there were only 10 periods due to a computer
crash.
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Figure 11. Earnings by agent type in the double auction market sessions (top six panels) and
the schedule market sessions (bottom six panels). The white space at the top of each panel
indicates the degree to which there was a loss in efficiency. (Recall that double auction market
Session 2 lasted for only 10 periods.) There are large inequalities in the double auction markets
where shares fluctuate over time. In contrast, the schedule markets result in more equal and
stable outcomes.
28
is roughly even (32.3%, 35.5%, 31.2%) in the schedule markets while it is very uneven1
(51.1%,20.5%,28.4%) in the double auction markets.29 Moreover, Figure 11 shows that2
the division of surplus by agent type is constant over time in the schedule market. In3
contrast, the shares earned by the different types fluctuate over time in the double auction4
market and in some instances the outcome is extreme inequality. See, for instance, double5
auction market Sessions 3 and 5. 6
6. Conclusion7
General equilibrium theory is one of the triumphs of modern economic analysis. It8
provides a complete account of entire economies, predicting the exchanges required to9
arrive at Pareto efficient allocations as well as the prices that define the terms of exchange.10
The assumptions underlying the theory are that agents maximize their utility at given11
prices, i.e. price-taking behavior, and that prices are such that no good is in excess12
demand or supply, i.e. prices are market clearing.13
Despite its powerful mathematical structure and broad applicability, general equilib-14
rium theory is a static theory that does not address how market clearing prices come15
about. Walras posited a centralized price adjustment process, where a fictitious auction-16
eer adjusts prices in response to reported demands until market clearing prices are found17
after which trade occurs. While this “tatonnement” process converges for economies sat-18
isfying gross substitutability, Scarf’s (1960) simple example demonstrates that without19
this strong assumption, prices may cycle forever thus precluding trade from occurring.20
In other words, prices are globally unstable in Scarf’s economy, which is perpetually out21
of equilibrium.22
This prediction suggests that the Scarf economy forms an ideal test for general equi-23
librium theory. And laboratory experiments are the perfect tool to perform such a test.24
For all the quibbles about representativeness, selection effects, external validity, and25
lab-field generalizability, one might almost forget about the enormous potential for con-26
trolled laboratory experimentation to address questions of basic science. In a pioneering27
study, Anderson et al. (2004) capitalize on this potential by testing the Scarf economy28
in a series of double auction market experiments. Their results are fascinating. While29
the double auction is a non-tatonnement institution, average trade prices in the experi-30
ments cycle along a closed orbit around the unique competitive equilibrium with no clear31
sign of convergence just as the tatonnement model predicts. This is a profound finding32
that reveals the limits with which general equilibrium models can be applied to predict33
economic outcomes. Moreover, it has repercussions for the performance of naturally oc-34
curring markets, since most contemporary financial and commodity markets employ the35
double auction institution.36
In this paper we replicate the findings of the Anderson et al. (2004) study. Our37
double auction market experiments confirm that the tatonnement model predicts the38
29The 95 percent confidence intervals for the division of gains among the three types are (31.7-33.0%,
33.5-37.5%, 30.5-33.8%) for the schedule market and (44.2-58.0%, 12.8-28.1%, 24.8-32.1%) in the double
auction. The confidence intervals were calculated using bootstrapping with clustering on groups. The
Gini coefficients for the double auction and schedule markets are 0.28 and 0.05 respectively.
29
direction of price changes remarkably well and that prices are globally unstable as a1
result. We then ask two important questions that go beyond replication of the Anderson2
et al. study. First, since competitive equilibrium is never reached in the double auction3
market, the tatonnement model predicts no trade. But out-of-equilibrium trades occur4
all the time in the experiment, which raises the question “what model explains out-of-5
equilibrium trading?” Second, we demonstrate the negative impact of price instability6
for the economy’s performance, in terms of efficiency and equality (see Figure 11), and7
ask the market design question “how can the economy be fixed, i.e. what institution8
stabilizes prices and delivers efficient and equitable outcomes?”9
With regards to the first question, we provide clear evidence of price-taking behavior10
in the absence of market clearing. Within a period, traders exchange goods in fixed ratios11
determined by the prices until they hold equal proportions of the goods. Because prices12
are out of equilibrium, not all traders can achieve a balanced portfolio resulting in some13
unused units. These imbalances put upward or downward pressures on prices, which then14
adjust according to the tatonnement model. The simple price-taking model predicts the15
allocations of the goods and the division of the total gains from trade extraordinarily16
well (see Figures 8 and 9).17
With regards to the second question, we provide clear evidence that a call market18
where traders submit demand schedules fixes the Scarf economy. Our proposal is inspired19
by Smale’s (1976a; 1976b) work on Newtonian methods and his desire to “Extend the20
mathematical model of general equilibrium theory to include price adjustments,” which21
he deemed to be one of the great problems for the 21st century (Smale, 1998). Specifically,22
our proposed solution is to let agents submit demand schedules, i.e. a list of quantities23
demanded at various prices, and then an automated market mechanism based on the24
global Newton method is run to determine the terms of trade.25
In the schedule market, price-taking behavior takes the form of submitting a “com-26
petitive schedule,” i.e. a set of quantities that are utility maximizing taking prices as27
given. We prove that price-taking behavior is a weakly dominant strategy (see Propo-28
sition 4). While the proof relies on the specific parametrization of the Scarf economy,29
the results are more generally true in large economies where agents face supply curves30
that are approximately flat. As a consequence, submitting a competitive schedule is31
optimal for arbitrary specifications of preferences and endowments when the economy32
grows large.33
We also test the schedule market in the laboratory and find that it performs ex-34
tremely well. In most periods, prices are close to the competitive equilibrium values and35
between periods converge quickly to the competitive equilibrium (see Figures 5 and 6).36
Importantly, the schedule market is able to translate price stability into improved per-37
formance: observed efficiency is 95% (compared to 77% in the double auction market)38
and outcomes are highly egalitarian (see Figure 11). Besides the desirable theoretical39
properties and the excellent performance in our empirical tests, schedule markets are also40
practical. Electricity markets and treasury auctions allow for schedules, which are also41
used to determine opening prices for the day on the New York Stock Exchange.42
Our results thus have implications for market design that extend beyond the Scarf43
economy. Nowadays, variants of the tatonnement institution are frequently used in auc-44
tions to privatize major public assets. For instance, in the FCC’s simultaneous ascending45
30
auction, the price of items for which demand exceeds supply is increased until there is1
no more excess demand. Submitting demand schedules could be an alternative to the2
iterative adjustment of prices. Univariate functions can be used for schedules in cases3
(like our experiment) where each trader desires to exchange one type of good for another.4
Vector functions can be used in cases where traders demand a number of different goods.5
Our experimental results demonstrate that in settings with complementarities and in-6
come effects, an institution whose price adjustments approximate tatonnement dynamics7
does not necessarily result in competitive equilibrium outcomes while a call market that8
admits schedules does.9
Appendix A. The schedule market without the admissibility restriction10
Without the admissibility restriction, submitting a competitive schedule is optimal11
when others behave competitively. In other words, all agents submitting competitive12
schedules constitutes a Nash equilibrium even when we drop the admissibility restric-13
tion.14
Proposition A1. In a Scarf economy with n ≥ 1 agents of each type, it is a Nash15
equilibrium for all agents to submit a competitive schedule.16
Proof. Consider the type-A agents. When the type-B and type-C agents submit com-17
petitive schedules the supply of B in terms of A will be one-to-one, i.e. for every q units18
of B supplied q units of A are demanded. This implies that the relative price of the19
two goods has to be one, i.e. when others submit competitive schedules then the supply20
curve the type-A agents face is “flat” at a relative price of 1. A similar logic holds for21
the other agent types. Hence, no agent can do better by submitting a non-competitive22
schedule. 23
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 524
Proposition 5. In a repeated Scarf economy with any value of α and starting from25
any prices p0, if agents of type A, B, and C submit schedules DˆBA(pt−1, p), DˆCB(pt−1, p),26
and DˆAC(pt−1, p) respectively, then prices will converge to the unique competitive equi-27
librium of the economy over successive periods.28
Proof. The supply schedule SˆYX(pt−1, q) = qDˆ−1XY (pt−1, q) is readily calculated as29
SˆYX(pt−1, q) =
α+ pt−1
1 + pt−1
− αq
The amount of A traded, qA, as a function of past prices pAt−1 and p
B
t−1, follows by30
solving qA = SAB(p
B
t−1/p
A
t−1, SBC(1/p
B
t−1, SCA(p
A
t−1, q
A))). Analogous expressions apply31
to qB and qC . Period t prices are then given by pAt = q
C(pAt−1, p
B
t−1)/q
A(pAt−1, p
B
t−1) and32
31
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Figure B1. The left panel shows the phase portrait for the dynamical system (Equation B.1)
when α = 5 together with a typical price path. The right panel shows the same for the reciprocal
value α = 1
5
.
pBt = q
C(pAt−1, p
B
t−1)/q
B(pAt−1, p
B
t−1). This yields the following discrete dynamical system1
( pAt
pBt
)
=
( 1
1
)
+
( g(pAt−1, pBt−1, α)
g(pBt−1, p
A
t−1,
1
α )
)
(B.1)
where2
g(p, q, α) = (1− α2) (p
2 − q)(1 + q) + α(p+ q)(1− pq)
α2p(α+ p) + q2(1 + p− α2(1− α)) + (1 + p)q(1− α(1− p) + α3)
It is readily verified that pA = pB = 1 is the unique rest point, or equilibrium, of the3
system (Equation B.1). Note that for α = 1, prices converge to equilibrium in one4
iteration and that the dynamical system for α > 1 is identical to that for 1/α < 1 with5
pAt and p
B
t interchanged. In other words, the price paths that occur for 1/α are obtained6
by mirroring the price paths for α in the 45-degree line. Hence, we can focus on the case7
α > 1.8
The left panel of Figure B1 shows a typical phase portrait for the system (Equation9
B.1) when α > 1. The upward sloping thin curve corresponds to price pairs where pA10
does not change and the downward sloping thin curve corresponds to price pairs where pB11
does not change. Their unique intersection corresponds to the equilibrium point (1, 1).12
The arrows indicate the direction of price changes in each of the four regions. The type of13
price dynamics that is consistent with this phase portrait is (i) convergence to the unique14
equilibrium, (ii) a limit cycle around the unique equilibrium, or (iii) divergence of prices.15
32
In the latter two cases, the unique equilibrium has to be locally unstable. But a direct1
computation shows that the eigenvalues of the linearized system around (pA, pB) = (1, 1)2
have squared norm equal to3
3
4
(1− α)2
α+ (1− α)2 < 1
So the unique equilibrium is locally stable, and, hence, the phase portrait implies that4
only (i) can occur, i.e. the system is globally stable. The black piecewise linear curve5
in the left panel shows an example of a price path that starts at (pA, pB) = ( 14 , 1) and6
cycles inwards to the unique equilibrium in a clockwise fashion.7
The right panel of Figure A1 shows the phase portrait, the curves that define no8
change, and a price path starting at (pA, pB) = (1, 14 ) for the reciprocal value of α =
1
5 .9
Note that the right panel can be simply obtained by mirroring the left panel in the 45-10
degree line. Also in this case, prices converge to the unique equilibrium but now in a11
counter-clockwise fashion. 12
Appendix C. Replication of Anderson et al. (2004)13
In this appendix we discuss in detail Results 1, 2, and 4 from the Anderson et al.14
(2004) study. These three results pertain to their “cycling” treatment I, which we used15
for our experiments. Anderson et al. also consider other treatments, which we did16
not replicate. In this appendix we only consider data from our double auction market17
sessions.18
The first result concerns changes in average prices between periods.19
Anderson et al. (2004) Result 1. Changes in price have the same sign20
as own-market excess demand.21
We replicate this result. Following Anderson et al, the excess demand in each market22
was computed using the average prices in period t. The sign of the excess demand was23
compared to the sign of the change in average prices in each market between period t24
and period t+1. Data from the markets for good A and good B were pooled. Of the 17025
price changes, 131 (77.1%) had the same sign as excess demand. The p-value of a one-26
tailed sign test of the null hypothesis that the direction of price changes is independent27
of excess demand is less than 10−6. 28
The second result concerns whether prices converge to the competitive equilibrium prices.29
Anderson et al. (2004) Result 2. In treatments in which the Scarf model30
predicts orbits: (i) average prices near the end of the experimental sessions are31
not close to the equilibrium prices; (ii) prices exhibit no movement toward32
the equilibrium; (iii) average prices not close to the equilibrium prices are33
observed moving in the direction predicted by the orbiting model.34
We replicate these results. (i) Average prices are said to be close to equilibrium if the35
prices are in the range (pA, pB) ∈ [36.5, 43.5]× [16.5, 23.5]. Attention is restricted to the36
33
Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 Pooled
βAA 0.54 1.64 0.73
∗∗ 1.77∗∗ 1.08∗∗ 1.26∗ 0.76∗∗
(0.29) (0.81) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) (0.51) (0.17)
βBA -1.58
∗∗ 2.03 2.80∗∗ -0.02 2.00∗ -0.16 0.28
(0.28) (1.45) (0.81) (0.24) (0.84) (0.53) (0.32)
# Obs 15 10 15 15 15 15 85
βAB -0.09 0.21
∗ 0.05 0.70∗ -0.04∗ 0.07 0.06
(0.18) (0.06) (0.03) (0.28) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03)
βBB 0.60
∗∗ 0.83∗∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.89∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.59∗∗
(0.18) (0.12) (0.12) (0.27) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)
# Obs 15 10 15 15 15 15 85
Table C1. Estimating a more general price adjustment model using between-period price
changes. Prices are normalized so that the competitive equilibrium is (1, 1) and excess demand
for a good is normalized by dividing by the total quantity of that good in the economy. Standard
errors are in parentheses; ∗ indicates p < 0.05, ∗∗ indicates p < 0.01.
last seven periods of each experimental session. In none of these 42 final seven periods are1
average prices close to the Walrasian equilibrium. (ii) This is our Result 1, and support2
for this result is discussed in Section 5.1. Anderson et al. (2004) consider a slightly3
more general price adjustment model that allows for different speeds of adjustment in4
the markets for good A and good B. To analyze whether this makes a difference we5
estimate6
pt+1A − ptA = βAAEA(ptA, ptB) + βBAEB(ptA, ptB) + ϵ
pt+1B − ptB = βABEA(ptA, ptB) + βBBEB(ptA, ptB) + ϵ
The results are shown in Table C1. First, the speed of adjustments βAA and β
B
B are not7
significantly different. Second, in both markets, price adjustments depend only on the8
excess demand in that market, i.e. βBA and β
A
B are not significantly different from 0. (iii)9
The clock-hand test and the quadrant test can be used to test whether the observed price10
paths are consistent with orbiting. Pooling all periods, in 79 of the 85 periods, the clock-11
hand direction of the price change was in the direction predicted by the orbiting model12
(p < 10−6 under the null hypothesis that clockwise and counter-clockwise movements13
are equally likely). Similarly, using the quadrant test, in 48 of the 85 periods, the price14
change was in the quadrant predicted by the orbiting model (p < 10−6 under the null15
hypothesis that movements into each of the four quadrants are equally likely). 16
The next result pertaining to the cycling treatment concerns price changes within periods17
rather than between periods and compares three models of price adjustment.18
Anderson et al. (2004) Result 4. In the orbiting treatments, trade-to-19
trade price movements (i) are not more consistent with simple convergence20
than with the Scarf model; (ii) are not more consistent with simple conver-21
gence than responding proportional to instantaneous excess demand; and (iii)22
are not more consistent with responding to instantaneous excess demand than23
with excess demand calculated at initial endowments (the Scarf model).24
34
Market A Market B
(I) Price Changes
#price changes/#transactions 1121/1679 1892/2863
(66.8%) (66.1%)
(II) Correctly predicted sign of price change
Convergent model 525/1121∗ 884 /1892∗∗
(46.7%) (46.7%)
Scarf model 748/1121∗∗∗ 1096 /1892∗∗∗
(66.7%) (57.9%)
Instantaneous excess demand model 766/1121∗∗∗ 1114/1892∗∗∗
(68.3%) (58.9%)
(III) Comparing Models
Scarf vs. Convergent 429/649∗∗∗ 698/1227∗∗∗
(66.1%) (56.9%)
Instantaneous excess demand vs. Convergent 419/609∗∗∗ 647/1107∗∗∗
(68.9%) (58.4%)
Instantaneous excess demand vs. Scarf 31/45∗ 100/182
(68.9%) (54.9%)
Table C2. Trade-to-trade sign test results based on within-period prices. For parts (II) and
(III), the null hypothesis that the sign of the price change is correctly predicted with probability
0.5 is tested against a two-sided alternative. ∗ indicates p < 0.05, ∗∗ indicates p < 0.01, ∗∗∗
indicates p < 0.001.
We replicate a slightly stronger versions of these results. We find that the simple con-1
vergence model predicts the sign of price changes considerably worse than the other two2
models and that the instantaneous excess demand model does slightly better than the3
Scarf model. The results of a series of sign tests are reported in Table C2. Part (I) of the4
table shows that the price changed after approximately two thirds of the transactions5
in both markets. Part (II) considers the transactions where the price did change and6
reports the number of times each of the three models correctly predicts the sign of the7
price change. Part (III) compares pairs of models. Attention is restricted to transactions8
where the price changed and two models predict different signs for the price change. The9
number of times the first named model of the pair correctly predicts the price change10
is reported. In both markets, the simple convergence model does worst. The Scarf and11
instantaneous excess demand models perform similarly, with the instantaneous excess12
demand model doing slightly better. 13
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